关于乐观地看北京:为什么民主制度无法征服中国

BEiiing Through Rasses:Democracy Cannot Tame ChinaBy Harry Harding There is an increasing drumbeat for pushing a democraticproject in China to *fend off its inevitable aggressiveauthoritarian ambitions. There is little doubt that China willwish to become a preeminent4 power in its own hemisphere.But the argument that creating a pluralistic， democraticsystem in China will sideline7 a coming clash betweenWashington and BEIjing is overly optimistic. Certainly it istrue that China and the United States will be competitors，even rivals， not only because one is an established powerand the other a rising power， but also because their politicalsystems embody very different ideologies. American conceptsof democracy pose an existential threat to the Communistregime; Successful Chinese growth under an authoritariansystem is a threat to American leadership and exceptionalism. Recently， *Aaron Friedberg8 masterfully combined， in away that is quite unusual， realist and non-realist componentsin an argument whose crescend is that "it is likely thata more democratic China would ultimately create a morepeaceful， less war-prone environment in Asia." It would also，of course， simultaneously remove the threat to the American 目前在推动中国的民主事业，以抵御该国不可避免的气势逼人的强烈专制欲上，鼓噪之声渐强。中国想要在其所处的半球成为一个有影响力的杰出大国，这一点几乎没有什么疑问。然而，认为在中国创造一个多元化的民主体制将避免华盛顿和北京所面临的冲突，这种看法太过乐观。毫无疑问，中国和美国将是竞争对手，乃至敌手。这不仅是因为一个是公认的大国，另一个是崛起中的大国，还因为两国的政治体制包含着截然不同的意识形态。美国的民主理念对中共政权构成了现存的威胁；中国经济在专制体制下的成功发展对美国的领导地位和例外论也构成威胁。 最近，阿伦·弗里德伯格以一种相当不同寻常的方式在一个观点中巧妙融合了现实主义和非现实主义因素，其主旨是说，“一个更加民主的中国最终很可能会在亚洲创造出一个更加和平、不那么容易爆发战争的环境”。当然，这样一来，对美国sense of ideological supremacy. Thus "in the long run， theUnited States can learn to live with a democratic China asthe dominant power in East Asia， much as Great Britaincame to accept America as the preponderant power in theWestern Hemisphere." But， "until that day， Washingtonand Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasinglyintense struggle for mastery in Asia." This is an argument that has been made before.It's one of the rosy forecasts that Jim Mann has called a"soothing scenario." And it is fraught with uncertainty.It is， in fact， highly unlikely that China will become a trulydemocratic political system， and moreover a democratizingMiddle Kingdom may well beoverwhelmed by the nationalisticsentiments that are part of China'scontemporary political culture. Evenif we arbitrarily and optimistically*assign a 50 percent probability toeach of these outcomes， over thenext decade *or so， that mean's thatthe chances of a Chinese regime thatis both democratic and cooperativewould be no more than 25 percent.Those are not the best of odds. Norare these odds of true democratizationwithin our ability to change. Given this， it is far more importantto ask the fundamental question of howthe United States can manage China'srise through its own behavior. Which leads us to some of the policy implications that those others who *cling to thedemocratization-as-solution mantra might be better servedby drawing. Rather than simply hoping for democratization，I would look toward creating greater economic*，意识形态优越感的威胁也将随之消除。因此，“从长期来看，美国能够学会与一个作为东亚头号强国的民主中国和平共处，就像英国逐渐接受美国在西半球的主导地位一样”。不过，“在这一天到来之前，华盛顿和北京仍将处在争夺亚洲控制权的日益激烈的斗争当中”。 之前就有人提出过这一观点。这是被吉姆·曼称为“欣慰局面”的乐观预测之一。而且这个观点充满变数。事实上，中国极不可能实行一个真正民主的政治体制。此外，一个民主化的中国或许会被民族主义情绪所淹没。民族主义是中国当代政治文化的一部分。即便我们主观且乐观地把这些结果在未来十年左右的时间里出现的可能性都定为50％，那么就意味着中国政权变得既民主又合作的可能性不会超过25％。这并不是最有可能出现的情况，在我们的改变能力之内实现(中国)真正的民主化也不是最有可能出现的情景。 有鉴于此，尤为重要的是提出这样一个根本问题：美国如何能够通过自身行为应对中国的崛起?对于那些坚持反复提及“靠民主制度解决问题”的人，我们在这里提出一点政策建议：抽签问卦对他们而言或许是一个更好的办法。 我认为，与其只是寄期望于民主化改革，倒不如在中国、美国和亚洲其他国家之间interdependence between China， the United States and therest of Asia. The Communist party is.dependent on economicgrowth for legitimacy--and that growth presently depends verymuch on exports， and exports depend very much on forEigninvestment. The policy of economic rebalancing that BEIjingis attempting may change those ratios somewhat， makingthe Chinese economy increasingly dependent on domesticconsumption and less reliant on exports， and exports morecontingent on Chinese firms and less on foreign investedones. But as the economy matures， there will also be increasinginterest in outbound Chinese foreign investment， and that willincrease Beijing's interdependence with the rest of the world--albeit in a different form. This creates an environment in whichAmerican can promote interdependence based on reciprocity.Actively welcome Chinese investment in the United States， aslong as comparable opportunities are available for American(and other foreign) firms in China. Chineseinvestment in an advanced economy likethat of the United States will mean. thatChinese goods sold stateside wil1 beincreasingly produced by American--notChinese--workers. Concomitantly， it willgive those Chinese firms with investmentsin the United States a *stake in stablerelations between Washington and Beijing. Second， continue to welcomeChina's growing presence within existinginternational institutions--like the IMF，the World Bank and the United Nations--and its efforts tocreate new organizations to meet unfilled needs--like theSCO， the ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit--as long asthe United States is also given an appropriate role. There is ahuge difference between a rising power that wants more saywithin the existing international system and a rising power thatwants to promote fundamental changes to that system. It willbe key to ensure that those institutions--both old and new--are robust enough to simultaneously impose some constraintson Chinese behavior and reassure Beijing that its rise is beingaccommodated. Above all， the United States needs to maintain a favorable*balance of power in the region. China may wish to dominate